Can we trust the record? Before we interpret the evidence, we need to know whether someone changed it. Forensics happens after the attack, when the audit logs are often the only witness and the attacker has had time to edit them. We build audit logging that makes such tampering detectable at low overhead. Nitro, built on eBPF, detects edited and deleted log entries with 10 to 25 times lower overhead than prior work in stress tests, and it received a Distinguished Paper Award at ACM CCS 2025. Earlier work protects logs with trusted execution hardware (Custos) and measures whether reduced or approximated logs still hold the evidence an investigation needs.
Selected Papers
2025
ACM CCS
Rethinking Tamper-Evident Logging: A High-Performance, Co-Designed Auditing System
Rui Zhao, Muhammad Shoaib, Viet Tung Hoang, and Wajih Ul Hassan
In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2025
Existing tamper-evident logging systems suffer from high overhead and severe data loss in high-load settings, yet only provide coarse-grained tamper detection. Moreover, installing such systems requires recompiling kernel code. To address these challenges, we present Nitro, a high-performance, tamper-evident audit logging system that supports fine-grained detection of log tampering. Even better, our system avoids kernel recompilation by using the eBPF technology. To formally justify the security of Nitro, we provide a new definitional framework for logging systems, and give a practical cryptographic construction meeting this new goal. Unlike prior work that focus only on the cryptographic processing, we codesign the cryptographic part with the pre- and post-processing of the logs to exploit all system-level optimizations. Our evaluations demonstrate Nitro’s superior performance, achieving 10X-25X improvements in high-stress conditions and 2X-10X in real-world scenarios while maintaining near-zero data loss. We also provide an advanced variant, Nitro-R that introduces in-kernel log reduction techniques to reduce runtime overhead even further.
@inproceedings{nitro,title={Rethinking Tamper-Evident Logging: A High-Performance, Co-Designed Auditing System},author={Zhao, Rui and Shoaib, Muhammad and Hoang, Viet Tung and Hassan, Wajih Ul},booktitle={ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)},year={2025},doi={10.1145/3719027.3765024}}
2023
IEEE S&P
SoK: History is a Vast Early Warning System: Auditing the Provenance of System Intrusions
Muhammad Adil Inam, Yinfang Chen, Akul Goyal, Jason Liu, Jaron Mink, Noor Michael, Sneha Gaur, Adam Bates, and 1 more author
In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P), 2023
Auditing, a central pillar of operating system security, has only recently come into its own as an active area of public research. This resurgent interest is due in large part to the notion of data provenance, a technique that iteratively parses audit log entries into a dependency graph that explains the history of system execution. Provenance facilitates precise threat detection and investigation through causal analysis of sophisticated intrusion behaviors. However, the absence of a foundational audit literature, combined with the rapid publication of recent findings, makes it difficult to gain a holistic picture of advancements and open challenges in the area. In this work, we survey and categorize the provenance-based system auditing literature, distilling contributions into a layered taxonomy based on the audit log capture and analysis pipeline. Recognizing that the Reduction Layer remains a key obstacle to the further proliferation of causal analysis technologies, we delve further on this issue by conducting an ambitious independent evaluation of 8 exemplar reduction techniques against the recently-released DARPA Transparent Computing datasets. Our experiments uncover that past approaches frequently prune an overlapping set of activities from audit logs, reducing the synergistic benefits from applying them in tandem; further, we observe an inverse relation between storage efficiency and anomaly detection performance. However, we also observe that log reduction techniques are able to synergize effectively with data compression, potentially reducing log retention costs by multiple orders of magnitude. We conclude by discussing promising future directions for the field.
@inproceedings{inam2022sok,title={SoK: History is a Vast Early Warning System: Auditing the Provenance of System Intrusions},author={Inam, Muhammad Adil and Chen, Yinfang and Goyal, Akul and Liu, Jason and Mink, Jaron and Michael, Noor and Gaur, Sneha and Bates, Adam and Hassan, Wajih Ul},booktitle={IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S\&P)},year={2023},doi={10.1109/sp46215.2023.10179405}}
2020
ACSAC
On the Forensic Validity of Approximated Audit Logs
Noor Michael, Jaron Mink, Jason Liu, Sneha Gaur, Wajih Ul Hassan, and Adam Bates
In Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), 2020
Auditing is an increasingly essential tool for the defense of computing systems, but the unwieldy nature of log data imposes significant burdens on administrators and analysts. To address this issue, a variety of techniques have been proposed for approximating the contents of raw audit logs, facilitating efficient storage and analysis. However, the security value of these approximated logs is difficult to measure—relative to the original log, it is unclear if these techniques retain the forensic evidence needed to effectively investigate threats. Unfortunately, prior work has only investigated this issue anecdotally, demonstrating sufficient evidence is retained for specific attack scenarios.
@inproceedings{approx,title={On the Forensic Validity of Approximated Audit Logs},author={Michael, Noor and Mink, Jaron and Liu, Jason and Gaur, Sneha and Hassan, Wajih Ul and Bates, Adam},year={2020},booktitle={Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC)},doi={10.1145/3427228.3427272}}
NDSS
Custos: Practical Tamper-Evident Auditing of Operating Systems Using Trusted Execution
Riccardo Paccagnella, Pubali Datta, Wajih Ul Hassan, Adam Bates, Christopher W. Fletcher, Andrew Miller, and Dave Tian
In Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS), 2020
System auditing is a central concern when investigating and responding to security incidents. Unfortunately, attackers regularly engage in anti-forensic activities after a breakin, covering their tracks from the system logs in order to frustrate the efforts of investigators. While a variety of tamper-evident logging solutions have appeared throughout the industry and the literature, these techniques do not meet the operational and scalability requirements of system-layer audit frameworks. In this work, we introduce CUSTOS, a practical framework for the detection of tampering in system logs. CUSTOS consists of a tamper-evident logging layer and a decentralized auditing protocol. The former enables the verification of log integrity with minimal changes to the underlying logging framework, while the latter enables near real-time detection of log integrity violations within an enterprise-class network. CUSTOS is made practical by the observation that we can decouple the costs of cryptographic log commitments from the act of creating and storing log events, without trading off security, leveraging features of off-the-shelf trusted execution environments. Supporting over one million events per second, we show that CUSTOS’ tamper-evident logging protocol is three orders of magnitude (1000×) faster than prior solutions and incurs only between 2% and 7% runtime overhead over insecure logging on intensive workloads. Further, we show that CUSTOS’ auditing protocol can detect violations in near realtime even in the presence of a powerful distributed adversary and with minimal (3%) network overhead. Our case study on a real-world APT attack scenario demonstrates that CUSTOS forces anti-forensic attackers into a "lose-lose" situation, where they can either be covert and not tamper with logs (which can be used for forensics), or erase logs but then be detected by CUSTOS.
@inproceedings{custos,title={{Custos: Practical Tamper-Evident Auditing of Operating Systems Using Trusted Execution}},author={Paccagnella, Riccardo and Datta, Pubali and Hassan, Wajih Ul and Bates, Adam and Fletcher, Christopher W. and Miller, Andrew and Tian, Dave},year={2020},booktitle={Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS)},doi={10.14722/ndss.2020.24065}}