Trustworthy Evidence

Can we trust the record? Before we interpret the evidence, we need to know whether someone changed it. Forensics happens after the attack, when the audit logs are often the only witness and the attacker has had time to edit them. We build audit logging that makes such tampering detectable at low overhead. Nitro, built on eBPF, detects edited and deleted log entries with 10 to 25 times lower overhead than prior work in stress tests, and it received a Distinguished Paper Award at ACM CCS 2025. Earlier work protects logs with trusted execution hardware (Custos) and measures whether reduced or approximated logs still hold the evidence an investigation needs.

Selected Papers

2025

  1. ACM CCS
    Rethinking Tamper-Evident Logging: A High-Performance, Co-Designed Auditing System
    Rui Zhao, Muhammad Shoaib, Viet Tung Hoang, and Wajih Ul Hassan
    In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2025

2023

  1. IEEE S&P
    SoK: History is a Vast Early Warning System: Auditing the Provenance of System Intrusions
    Muhammad Adil Inam, Yinfang Chen, Akul Goyal, Jason Liu, Jaron Mink, Noor Michael, Sneha Gaur, Adam Bates, and 1 more author
    In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P), 2023

2020

  1. ACSAC
    On the Forensic Validity of Approximated Audit Logs
    Noor Michael, Jaron Mink, Jason Liu, Sneha Gaur, Wajih Ul Hassan, and Adam Bates
    In Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), 2020
  2. NDSS
    Custos: Practical Tamper-Evident Auditing of Operating Systems Using Trusted Execution
    Riccardo Paccagnella, Pubali Datta, Wajih Ul Hassan, Adam Bates, Christopher W. Fletcher, Andrew Miller, and Dave Tian
    In Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS), 2020

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